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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue in this case is whether ERISA's definition of 
"fiduciary" includes an entity that receives contributions 
from employers and awards benefits to participants 
pursuant to an agreement with trustees of a union welfare 
fund. We conclude that the allegations in plaintiff's 
complaint were sufficient to preclude a ruling that no 
fiduciary status existed as a matter of law. Accor dingly, we 
will reverse the District Court's ruling that the complaint 
failed to state a claim. 
 
The facts are taken from the plaintif f's proposed amended 
complaint. Plaintiff is the Board of T rustees of Bricklayers 
and Allied Craftsman Local 6 of New Jersey W elfare Fund, 
an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. S 1002(3). The members of the Boar d of Trustees 
have the discretionary authority to manage and control the 
Local 6 Fund and are fiduciaries under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 
S 1002(21)(A). They meet only four to six times a year. 
 
In 1988, the Board entered into an agr eement providing 
that defendant Wettlin Associates, Inc. would provide 
administrative services to Local 6 Fund. The Boar d 
delegated to Wettlin the day-to-day r esponsibility to control, 
manage, hold, safeguard, and account for the fund's assets 
and income. Wettlin determined the legitimate expenses of 
the fund, wrote checks, and disbursed assets fr om the 
fund's bank account in accordance with such 
determinations. That conduct was within W ettlin's 
discretion and it was not required to seek approval from the 
Trustees in advance. 
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Wettlin was also required to collect contributions from 
employers under the terms of collective bar gaining 
agreements, deposit them in Local 6 Fund's bank account, 
and make payments in accordance with the fund's 
obligations under the plan. As stated in the agr eement, 
Wettlin would receive the following monthly compensation: 
 
         Welfare Fund              $2,208.33 
 
         Pension Fund              $  833.33 
 
         Annuity Fund              $  833.33 
 
         Apprentice Training Fund  $   41.67 
 
            TOTAL                  $3,916.66 
 
According to the complaint, "effective as of January, 
1996, the [Local 6] Fund also collected fringe benefit funds 
from contributing employers which, in tur n, were to be 
transferred by the Fund for deposit to the New Jersey 
Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers Health Fund[(`state- 
wide fund')]." In carrying out this arrangement, Wettlin was 
to transfer ninety-eight percent of the employer 
contributions earmarked for the state-wide fund to that 
entity. The amended complaint alleges that the two percent 
not transferred became an asset of Local 6 Fund. 
 
In February 1998, the Board notified W ettlin that its 
services would terminate on April 1, 1998. Beginning on 
March 1 and continuing through Mar ch 31, Wettlin paid 
itself $42,743.71 from the Local 6 Fund account, the 
amount representing the two percent withheld from 
payments to the state-wide fund. 
 
Upon learning of this series of payments, the Board 
demanded reimbursement, and when this was r efused, filed 
suit in the District Court of New Jersey. The Boar d alleged 
that Wettlin was a fiduciary under ERISA and had breached 
its duty to the fund. The complaint also pleaded various 
state law claims. 
 
Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b)(6), the 
District Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint because it 
failed to offer any factual basis to support its allegation that 
defendant was a fiduciary under ERISA. Plaintif f then 
proffered an amended complaint, which was rejected by a 
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magistrate judge on the ground that it failed to state a 
claim that would survive a motion to dismiss. The District 
Judge agreed and dismissed the case, observing that 
Wettlin's role was "nothing mor e than ministerial." The 
Board appealed. 
 
We exercise plenary review when examining the grant of 
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1411 
(3d Cir. 1993). We accept the allegations of the complaint as 
true and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. Id. Only if it appears certain that 
a plaintiff could prove no set of facts supporting its claim 
and entitling it to relief do we affir m. Wisniewski v. Johns- 
Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir . 1985). 
 
The Board of Trustees argues that W ettlin can be a 
fiduciary under ERISA because discretion is not always a 
prerequisite for such a role. Even if discretion is required, 
the Board contends that the amended complaint sets forth 
a factual basis for concluding that Wettlin did function in 
that manner. Wettlin contends that it was not a fiduciary 
because it acted in a ministerial capacity, exer cised no 
discretion, and additionally asserts that the money in 
question was not an asset of Local 6 Fund. 
 
The ERISA provision at the heart of this case sets out the 
description of a fiduciary: 
 
         "[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the 
         extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or 
         discretionary control respecting management of such 
         plan or exercises any authority or control respecting 
         management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders 
         investment advice for a fee . . . or has any authority or 
         responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary 
         authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
         administration of such plan." 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1002(21)(A) (emphasis added). 
 
This statutory definition requires that a fiduciary "must 
be someone acting in the capacity of manager , 
administrator, or financial advisor to a`plan.' " Pegram v. 
Herdrich, 530 U.S. ___ , 120 S.Ct. 2143, 2151 (2000). The 
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statute uses differing criteria in imposingfiduciary 
obligations for each of these roles. For planfinancial 
advisors, Congress assigned a fiduciary duty in subsection 
(ii) both to those who actually render advice and those who 
simply have the authority to do so. 29 U.S.C. 
S 1002(21)(A)(ii). For plan administrators, subsection (iii) 
limits fiduciary status to those who have discr etionary 
authority or discretionary responsibility. 29 U.S.C. 
S 1002(21)(A)(iii). For managers, subsection (i) sets the 
criteria. 
 
Subsection (i) of 29 U.S.C. S 1002(21)(A) dif ferentiates 
between those who manage the plan in general, and those 
who manage the plan assets. These functions ar e set out in 
two clauses under subsection (i) separated by the 
conjunction "or." A significant dif ference between the two 
clauses is that discretion is specified as a prerequisite to 
fiduciary status for a person managing an ERISA plan, but 
the word "discretionary" is conspicuously absent when the 
text refers to assets. "This distinction is not accidental -- it 
reflects the high standard of car e trust law imposes upon 
those who handle money or other assets on behalf of 
another." FirsTier Bank, N.A. v. Zeller, 16 F.3d 907, 911 
(8th Cir. 1994). See Daniel Candee Knickerbocker, Jr., 
Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA, S 2.05 (2000). 
 
This distinction was emphasized in IT Corp. v. General 
American Life Insurance Co., 107 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1997). 
In that case, the administrator had check-writing authority 
over the money received from the employer that was 
deposited in the plan's bank account. Id. at 1417. Noting 
that the "statute treats control over the cash differently 
from control over administration," the Court concluded that 
"`[a]ny' control over disposition of plan money makes the 
person who has the control a fiduciary." Id. at 1421. 
 
The Court of Appeals noted that because the employer 
had the responsibility to keep an amount in a bank 
account sufficient to cover checks validly issued by the 
administrator, "as a practical matter , a substantial amount 
of money would [have been] under the contr ol of [the 
administrator], in the form of a bank account which it 
could deplete by writing checks." Id. Where there is such 
"authority or control," the District Court could not hold that 
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the administrator was a non-fiduciary as a matter of law. 
Id. 
 
In Yeseta v. Baima, 837 F.2d 380, 386 (9th Cir. 1988), 
the same Court of Appeals held that a corporate officer who 
withdrew plan funds for the company's benefit was a 
fiduciary, despite authorization for the withdrawal from 
other officers. Noting that section 1002(21)(A) establishes 
that a person can be a fiduciary on the basis of control of 
a plan's assets, the Court concluded it was unnecessary to 
sort through the disputed facts to deter mine authority 
because control could decide the issue. Id . 
 
A corporate officer in LoPresti v. T erwilliger, 126 F.3d 34, 
40 (2d Cir. 1997), commingled company assets with benefit 
funds, and used them to pay company debts. Hinting that 
the District Court had apparently failed to appreciate the 
significance of the second clause of subsection (i), the Court 
of Appeals reversed. Id. It held that an individual may also 
become an ERISA fiduciary by exercising any authority or 
control in connection with the management or disposition 
of plan assets. Id. 
 
We come then to Confer v. Custom Engineering Co., 952 
F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1991), on which the District Court relied in 
the present case. Confer, a participant in an employee 
health benefit plan, alleged a breach offiduciary duty when 
he was denied medical benefits following an accident. Id. at 
35. He sued his employer, Custom Engineering Co., which 
was the plan's administrator and fiduciary, as well as the 
officers of that company. Id. He also named as a defendant 
Self-Funded Plans, Inc., which had been delegated day-to- 
day administrative tasks for the plan. Id. W e affirmed 
summary judgment in favor of the company officers, 
concluding that corporate officers acting on behalf of a 
corporation are not themselves fiduciaries unless they have 
individual discretionary roles in plan administration. Id. at 
37. 
 
More important to the case before us, we also held that 
Self-Funded, the day-to-day administrator, was not 
responsible for wrongfully denying benefits to the plaintiff. 
Id. at 39. "Since discretionary authority, responsibility or 
control is a prerequisite to fiduciary status, it follows that 
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persons who perform purely ministerial tasks, such as 
claims processing and calculation, cannot befiduciaries 
because they do not have discretionary r oles. Self-Funded 
had no discretion to deny or allow [plaintif f]'s claim." Id. 
(citation omitted). The plaintiff's assertion to the contrary 
had "no basis in the plan document, in Self-Funded's 
contract with Custom Engineering, or anywher e else in the 
record." Id. 
 
There are important distinctions between Confer and the 
case at hand. Self Funded's alleged breach was with regard 
to its responsibilities in the administration of benefits 
under the plan; therefore, its fiduciary status under ERISA 
was determined by subsection (iii) of 29 U.S.C. 
S 1002(21)(A). Plaintiff in that case never alleged 
mismanagement of assets. Thus, Confer concluded only 
that plaintiff had not demonstrated that Self-Funded had 
discretionary authority or discretionary r esponsibility in the 
administration of the plan. Confer, 952 F .2d at 39. 
 
Wettlin does not argue that subsection (iii) applies in the 
present case. Although Confer addr essed subsection (iii), 
id., Wettlin contends that the statements in that opinion 
linking fiduciary status and discretion apply to all ERISA 
fiduciaries. We reject this ar gument as contrary to the 
statutory text. "Discretionary" authority or responsibility is 
required to confer fiduciary status for plan administration 
under subsection (iii), and "discretionary" authority or 
"discretionary" control is r equired for plan management 
under subsection (i). As noted earlier, however, the adjective 
"discretionary," so carefully selected for plan administration 
and management, is omitted in subsection (i) when dealing 
with authority or control over the management or 
disposition of plan "assets." "The statute treats control over 
the cash differently from contr ol over administration." IT 
Corp., 107 F.3d at 1421. 
 
That Congress established a lower threshold for fiduciary 
status where control of assets is at stake is not surprising, 
given that "[a]t common law, fiduciary duties 
characteristically attach to decisions about managing 
assets and distributing property to beneficiaries." Pegram, 
120 S.Ct. at 2155 ("[T]he common law trustee's most 
defining concern historically has been the payment of 
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money in the interest of the beneficiary."). "By mandating 
the trust form and by transposing the duty of loyalty from 
trust to pension law, the drafters of ERISA wer e able to 
institute a familiar fiduciary regime to pr otect pension 
funds against internal defalcation." John H. Langbein & 
Bruce A. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law, 649 (2d 
ed. 1995). 
 
Finally, Confer cited a series of interpr etive questions and 
answers promulgated by the Department of Labor and 
published at 29 C.F.R. S 2509.75-8. Confer, 952 F.2d at 36- 
37. Wettlin contends that question D-2 is r elevant to our 
determination, characterizing its own actions as simply 
"administratively ministerial," similar to those the 
Department of Labor concluded were non-fiduciary 
functions of a plan administrator. After examining the 
Department of Labor's interpretation to which W ettlin 
points to, we conclude that it addresses situations like that 
in Confer, involving the administration of benefits under a 
plan, and does not speak to the activities under subsection 
(i).1 In any event, these agency interpretations are not 
binding on us. See Christensen v. Harris County , 529 U.S. 
___, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 1662-63 (2000). 
 
This is not the first case in which we have noted that the 
structure of subsection (i) is significant in its interpretation. 
In Curcio v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 33 
F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 1994), we observed that although the 
party in that case was not a fiduciary under the second half 
of subsection (i), separate analysis was necessary to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Wettlin relies on 29 C.F.R.S 2509.75-8 D-2, function (8), one of the 
categories that the Labor Department opines is non-fiduciary, as similar 
to its role in the present plan: "Collection of contributions and 
application of contributions as provided in the plan." The other listed 
functions in the illustrative answer are pur ely administrative. We also 
examined question FR-15, which states that a namedfiduciary may not 
delegate responsibility for management and control of plan assets to 
anyone other than investment managers. 29 C.F .R. S 2509.75-8 FR-15. 
As we read this answer, it distinguishes responsibility for management 
of assets from discretionary conduct in other management functions. 
Thus, read as a whole the questions and answers do not aid Wettlin's 
cause. 
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determine whether the first clause did give the party that 
status. 
 
Unlike the defendant in Confer, Wettlin's potential 
liability is created by subsection (i), which addresses fund 
assets and directs that fiduciary status be assigned to the 
extent that a person "exercises any authority or control 
respecting management or disposition of its assets." 29 
U.S.C. S 1002(21)(A)(i). To the extent it applied dicta in 
Confer to the analysis of subsection (i), the District Court 
erred. 
 
The contract attached to the plaintiff's amended 
complaint lists the functions to be perfor med by Wettlin. 
Most of these appear to be purely ministerial and are 
specifically subject to the direction of the trustees. The 
provisions directing Wettlin to collect contributions and 
write checks on Local 6 Fund's account, however , are quite 
general in scope. Wettlin would have us construe these 
terms narrowly, in effect establishing it as a mere 
depository of Local 6 Fund assets. See IT Corp. , 107 F.3d at 
1421. 
 
We are inclined to agree that ERISA does not consider as 
a fiduciary an entity such as a bank when it does no more 
than receive deposits from a benefit fund on which the fund 
can draw checks. The allegations in the amended 
complaint, however, do not describe W ettlin's role as so 
circumscribed. Rather, the amended complaint alleges that 
the Board delegated to defendant the "day to day 
responsibility to control, manage, hold, safeguard, and 
account for the Fund's assets and income." 
 
Moreover, the contract provides that Wettlin is to 
"[r]eceive request for benefits fr om employees and take 
appropriate action thereon." Notably lacking in the record is 
a description of the various benefits that ar e available and 
what actions the parties have considered to be 
"appropriate." 
 
At this stage we are left with substantial doubt that there 
exist no facts that might establish that Wettlin did indeed 
exercise such authority and control over the management 
and disposition of Local 6 Fund assets so as to come within 
the statutory definition of a fiduciary. Further development 
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is required and on this recor d we cannot say that, as a 
matter of law, Wettlin is not a fiduciary. The amended 
complaint does state a claim and the case should not have 
been dismissed at the pleading stage.2  
 
The Order of the District Court will be r eversed and the 
case will be remanded for further proceedings in 
accordance with this Opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
         Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
         for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
2. Because the issue was not raised in the District Court, we need not 
consider the Board's alternative ar gument that Wettlin is nevertheless 
liable as a party in interest under 29 U.S.C.SS 1106(a)(1)(D) and 
1132(a)(3). See Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney 
Inc., 530 U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2180 (2000). 
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